Does innovation in residential mortgage products explain rising house prices? No. by de Silva, Ashton J et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does innovation in residential mortgage
products explain rising house prices? No.
Ashton J de Silva and Jonathan Boymal and Jason Potts
and Stuart Thomas
RMIT University
30. January 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62548/
MPRA Paper No. 62548, posted 8. November 2014 14:46 UTC
1 
 
Does innovation in residential mortgage products 
explain rising house prices? No. 
 
Ashton de Silva, Jonathan Boymal, Stuart Thomas and Jason Potts 
School of Economics, Finance and Marketing 
RMIT University 
 
Abstract 
Like many consumer products, household mortgages have experienced significant innovation in recent 
decades, with mortgages becoming cheaper, more accessible, and with more features.  Many observers 
have expected that this would increase demand for houses, contributing to a rise in house prices. We 
investigate this relation, both in terms the extent and timing of innovation in residential mortgage 
products, and then we critically assess whether there is a link with Melbourne Metropolitan house prices 
(post 1980). Our conclusion is surprising: we find no apparent evidence of a relationship between 
residential mortgage innovation and house prices. 
Introduction 
Many drivers of house price growth have been suggested since the 1980s. These include 
demand-side drivers like population growth and relatively low interest rates as well as supply-
side factors including the lack of housing stock and rising construction costs.  It has also been 
suggested that mortgage market innovation has played a role in bringing about a change in the 
character of the housing market.  
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2010), for example, suggests that the increase in the 
rate of owner-occupiers with mortgages is partly explained by financial innovation. This view is 
can be seen to be consistent with a statement by Guy Debelle1 (emphasis added): 
“Through the late 1990s and first half of the 2000s, there was considerable product innovation in the Australian mortgage market. 
Lenders sought to cater for a wider range of potential borrowers and found new ways to assess their borrowing capacity. Some of 
this innovation has resulted in an easing in lending standards and an increase in risk for both borrowers and lenders, but its 
overwhelming effect has been to widen the range of households who can access finance” 
                                               
1
  Assistant Governor (Financial Markets) RBA-  http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2010/sp-ag-300310.html  
Accessed 21st October 2014 
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It is interesting to note that while the Reserve Bank of Australia2 has occasionally aired concerns 
about the potential for speculative demand to amplify the property cycle, it has not thus far,  
unlike many of its international counterparts including New Zealand, Canada, and Singapore3, 
promoted the use of macro-prudential policies of the sort that would aggressively constrain 
financial innovation. Nevertheless, financial innovations (such as low doc loans) remain popular 
targets to explain crises in housing affordability.    
In this article we investigate whether there is a link between mortgage product innovation and 
house prices. Using data for the Melbourne Metropolitan area we assess whether house price 
growth, in particular changes in the pattern of growth, is associated with mortgage product 
innovation. The results of our analysis lead us to conclude that mortgage innovation is not a 
driver of house price growth.   
We begin by defining mortgage innovation in the Australian market.  We then provide an 
overview of the phases of price growth in the Melbourne metropolitan housing market.  In the 
last section we critically assess the inter-relationship between innovations and house prices. 
Mortgage Product Innovation 
Tracing innovation in the mortgage market presents two challenges.  The first is to be able to 
appropriately define mortgage product innovation.  The second is that no database currently 
exists that catalogues mortgage innovation. 
In addressing the first challenge we adopt a three-part definition of innovation that has gained 
some acceptance within the industry (Ellis et al 2005):   
1. Flexibility in the timing of loan repayments and access to additional credit, 
2. Households having an enhanced ability to access funds, and 
3. Tailoring of products for specific purposes such as investments  
We considered any mortgage product change that corresponds to at least one of the above criteria 
to be an innovation.  Some of these innovations have been more prominent in public discussion 
than others.  This includes the changes to the loan-to-value ratios (LVRs) and the introduction of 
                                               
2
 http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-board-minutes/2014/02092014.html 
3
 For example, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s measures prohibiting banks from issuing more than 10 percent 
of new residential loans to customers who have an LVR of more than 80 percent. 
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low-document loans.  Historically LVRs were restricted to be no more than 80 percent.  This 
upper limit has been relaxed to the extent that in the lead up to the Global Financial Crisis, loans 
were being advanced up to 100 percent or more of the purchase price.    
The last criterion, tailoring of mortgage investment products, has been a particularly contentious 
innovation of late, as it is claimed that investor purchasers are thereby increasingly able to crowd 
out owner-occupiers, particularly first home buyers.  The degree to which this is occurring is not 
clear as there is a noticeable lack of research in this area, including testing whether these buyer 
types perceive property features the same way. 
An overarching fining was that two non-product change innovations – the growth of 
securitization, and the arrival of mortgage brokers into the mortgage market – were highly 
significant in changing the way in which the market operated, facilitating a more vibrant and 
efficient industry.   
In addressing the challenge of a lack of information of mortgage innovations in Australia we: 
1. Reviewed media releases from financial agencies focusing on the RBA, APRA and 
ASIC. 
2. Reviewed academic literature.  
3. Conducted interviews with key industry representatives.  
  
The results from our interviews and analysis are presented in Table 1.  A brief review of our 
interviewing approach is provided in our accompanying article (de Silva et al 2015) 
Three important principles in table 1 are evident.   
1. Innovations were often developed for particular consumers.  For example, low doc loans 
are reportedly developed in 1997 for Asian-based customers not wanting to divulge their 
financial position.   
2. The time between the initial idea or concept for a new mortgage product and the 
product’s eventual availability to the general consumer can be decades. This seems to 
indicate that the deregulation and ensuing competition was/is necessary for innovations to 
blossom (refer to Table 1, “pre-1980” innovations). This means that many innovations 
are supply-constrained (by regulation) rather than demand constrained by pricing or 
income. 
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3. Securitisation (1979, 1997/9) was necessary for ensuring growth in competition, 
particularly for the non-bank sector.  
 
Phases of dwelling price growth. 
 Melbourne metropolitan dwelling prices, like all Australian capital cities, have significantly increased in 
the last three decades.  Many factors have been cited in driving this price growth.  Table 2 provides a list 
of some of the more common factors often cited by market analysts.  
 
Table 2: Factors commonly cited as driving price growth  
Demand Supply Other 
Increase in Population Growth Increase in construction costs First home buyer grants 
Lowering of Interest rates Low supply of land Negative Gearing 
 
Restrictive planning controls Macroeconomic factors 
including inflation, gross 
disposable income and 
employment. 
Sources: Abelson et al (2005), Otto (2007) complemented by non-academic mainstream media. 
 
The degree to which each factor has influenced Melbourne Metropolitan house prices is likely to have 
changed over the last three decades. For example, construction cost increases are likely concentrated in 
recent decades. Furthermore, it is likely that the influence of some of these factors would vary by 
submarket, by location or by price segments. For instance low income suburbs will be more affected by 
first-home-buyer grants. 
 
In considering the impact of innovation we first consider the different price phases.  Table 3 together with 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the Melbourne metropolitan housing market.  Seven distinct price phases 
were identified using an econometric structural break test as a guide (Zeileis et al, 2002 & Zeileis et al 
2003).  Two interesting observations of the phases are: that the price growth of the early 80s is on par 
with the 1997-2003 price growth (in nominal terms) and that prices appear to be relatively more volatile 
following the GFC. 
 
Table 3: Phases of House Price Growth  
Phase Number and Span Phase descriptor Average 
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1: 1980 -1986 High Growth  12.4 
2: 1987-1989 Very High Growth  21.6 
3: 1990-1996 Low Growth 1.5 
4: 1997 -2003(Q2) High Growth  13.3 
5: 2003 (Q3) -2006 Low Growth 1.0 
6: 2007-2008 Moderate Growth  4.8 
7: 2009 - present Moderate Growth  4.1 
 
Authors calculations based on generealised econometric structural break tests (Zeileis et al, 2002 & 
Zeileis et al 2003) 
 
Figure 1: House Price Growth Phases and Lending rates 
 
Source: REIA (Melbourne Medians) ; RBA(90 day bank bill) and authors’ calculations. 
 
Innovation and House price growth. 
To determine whether there is an association between innovation and house price growth we need to 
consider several non-trivial factors, including the complex and evolving state of the housing market and 
the broader economy. This challenge is further intensified by the fact that there is little (if any) data over 
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time that provides a means of formally measuring the introduction and adoption of innovative products, 
either in aggregate or separately.  As noted previously, many of these innovations were targeted at 
particular consumers such as foreign investors that would predominantly engage in specific segments of 
the market. 
  
The lack of consistent product innovation data combined with the distinct phases of the house price data 
lead us to assess the relationship between price growth and innovations discursively rather than using 
formal econometric analysis. 
 
First, consider the three periods of high growth in contrast to two periods of low growth. High growth is 
phases one, two and four and low-growth is phases three and five.  Our investigations show that 
innovation leading up to the first growth phase was sparse, but significant.  Three key innovations 
occurred: the advent of the mortgage broking industry; securitization, and; mortgages with LVRs of 
100%.  Through phases one and two, significant deregulation occurred promoting increased competition 
with the entry of new players and the relaxing of bank regulation.  Consistent with Geradi et al (2010) we 
suggest that these changes were deemed by central authorities to be necessary to maintain financial 
stability.   
 
Importantly the low growth phase witnessed major changes including the privatisation of the CBA as well 
as the birth of new mortgage originators like Aussie Home loans. This was complemented by growth in 
foreign banks entering into the Australian mortgage market.  
 
 In the fourth (high growth) phase we observe that much of the product innovation we have today had 
already occurred.   What is also important about this period is that the degree to which these were adopted 
seems to have grown.  According to RBA/APRA  (APRA, 2007) indicated that the popularity of low-doc 
loans, interest rate discounting as well as high LVR mortgages had noticeably grown. Further, securities 
were sold overseas for the first time during this period.  It is also interesting to note that the  popularity of 
these products grew when house price appreciation was in its second lowest growth phase 2003(Q3)-
2006. 
   
Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that innovation (and competition) evolved throughout the different housing price 
growth phases. We therefore conclude there is no strong or even suggestive evidence that innovations 
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have influenced house price growth. This view is further supported if macroeconomic conditions are 
taken into consideration. For example the low growth phase beginning in 1990 is preceded by record high 
lending rates. The high growth phase beginning in 1997 is characterised by (relatively) low employment, 
inflation, lending rates and strong GDP and population growth.   
 
It is important to acknowledge international research into this area has suggested that housing market 
efficiency has improved as a result of the deregulation and the ensuing increase in competition (Scanlon 
2008).   Although we did not conduct efficiency tests we believe it is reasonable to expect that the same 
can be said for the Australian market. 
 
It is also important to recognise that there are certain idiosyncratic features of the Melbourne metropolitan 
market.  Nevertheless, we believe that our results are generalisable across Australian capital cities, 
although this may not extend to international counterparts, due to interactions with other policies in 
relation to tax treatment, education funding, social security, and so on. In particular we have noted that 
many central authorities have used macro-prudential policies to curb residential property price growth. 
We further note that this has been seen to be successful by many commentators.   
 
In summary, we began by noting that the approach to recent Australian prudential practice has been 
different from many of our international counterparts in that consumers have not been restricted from 
specific loan products.  Given that;  
• We find there is no discernable link between mortgage innovations and house price growth.  
• There are limits to the effectiveness of regulation4. 
• Regulations can become counter-productive5 
We find no justification for Australian policy makers and regulators to change their current approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4
 http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2010/sp-ag-300310.html#f1  (accessed October 22nd 2014) 
5
 “As financial systems become more complex, detailed rules and standards have become more burdensome and 
ineffective, if not counterproductive. If we wish to foster financial innovation, we must be careful not to impose 
rules that will inhibit it.” Greenspan (p48, 1997)  
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Table 1 
Phase 
Number 
and Span 
Phase 
descriptor 
Innovation (Mortgage Market)  
 
Pre 1980 N/A* 1965 Founding of Housing Loans Insurance Corporation (Intention to offer loans with less than 25% deposit) 
1972 Mortgage Broking Industry started 
1979 Mortgage Back Security Created (up to 100%) loan, this was a perculiarly a Non-bank product 
1: 1980 -
1986 
High 
Growth  
1980 Interest Rate ceilings on trading a savings bank deposits are dismantled from this time 
1981 Campbell enquiry tables it final report 
1982  Treasury Bond tender system is approved; Savings banks are allowed to accept deposits of up $100K from 
trading or profit making bodies; Minimum terms on trading bank fixed deposits are significantly reduced 
1983 Commonwealth announces it will allow the entry of ten new (domestically and foreign owned) banks; Martin 
Committee of review is announced 
1984  Campbell report is endorsed; All remaining controls on bank deposits are removed; The Australian stock 
exchanges and the securities industry are deregulated. 
1985  16 foreign banks are invited to establish operations in Australia; the first one begins in the last quarter; EFTPOS 
is introduced 
1986  Interest rate ceilings are removed on owner-occupier home-loans; First award based superannuation schemes are 
established  
2: 1987-
1989 
Very High 
Growth  
1988 Housing asset held by banks are given a 50% risk weighting as part of the introduction of consolidated risk-
weighted capital requirements. 
Redraw Facilities emerge.  
Entry of new players, 
3: 1990-
1996 
Low 
Growth 
1990 Six pillars policy is announced banning mergers between the largest six players.; Pyramid Building Society 
collapses 
1991 Privatisation of Commonwealth Bank of Australia begins 
1992 Authorised foreign banks are permitted to operate in Australia; Limits on number of new banks that can be 
established are removed; Australian Payment Clearing Association is established (APCA); First home loan originator 
emerge: Aussie Home Loans 
1996 Banks remove 1% difference between investor and owner occupier home loans.  
4: 1997 - High 1997 More market consolidation St George merges with Westpac 
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2003(Q2) Growth  1997-99  Low Doc Loans(partly aimed at Asian clients who did not want to reveal their financial information to 
Australian lenders) 
1997-99. Australian Mortgage securities issued overseas. 
1998 Lenders introduced home-equity loans, redraw facilities and reverse mortgages, all of which allowed households 
to borrow against the equity they have built up in their homes. Lenders also introduced interest-only loans and shared-
equity loans, which made it easier for households, particularly first home buyers, to purchase their home.   Loan 
products that better meet the needs of certain types of borrowers, such as those with irregular income streams or those 
who do not meet the standard lending criteria, were also introduced.  
2002 The Financial Services Reform Act (FSRA) 2001 comes into effect, introducing a single licensing regime for 
financial advice and dealings in relation to financial product. Crucially, the legislation was only applicable to financial 
planners selling mortgage products, and not to mortgage brokers; Mortgage and Finance Association of Australia 
(MFAA) first puts forward the idea of national regulation for mortgage brokers  
2003 ASIC report identifies a lack of barriers to entry for mortgage brokers and a range of associated issues . The same 
report claims that broker numbers have boomed 'over the past decade. 
5: 2003 
(Q3) -
2006 
Low 
Growth 
2006 RBA publishes findings showing how residential lending standards have significantly changed from pre 2000s.  
In addition, RBA also notes that interest rate margins for major banks has dropped from 450 to 120 basis points, (new) 
borrowers also receiving up to 60 basis points reduction.  Low doc loans now comprising 10% of market for new loans 
(compared to 1/2% pre 2000s)/High LVR loans have more than doubled to 16% since 2000. Regulation of the activities 
of mortgage brokers ‘just around the corner’ according to industry group, the Financial Planning Association (FPA).    
6: 2007-
2008 
Moderate 
Growth  
2008 Online platforms emerge 
7. 2009 - 
present 
Moderate 
Growth 
2010 Mortgage Broker Legislation finally comes into effect, meaning that all Australian brokers are to apply for an 
Australian credit licence (ACL) from July 1, with all practitioners to be registered by Dec 31, 2010. 
2013 The number of brokers down from 13,800 pre-GFC to 12,000. This is in part due to industry consolidation that 
followed on from the change of law in 2010. 
Primary Sources include Interviews, Williams (2009), RBA, ASIC publications including speeches etc.  * House price data was not available prior 
to 1980 
 
